OPINION OF A SCHOLAR - A Commentary on Inbau and Manak\u27s  Miranda v. Arizona -- Is It Worth the Cost? (A Sample Survey, with Commentary, of the Expenditure of Court Time and Effort) by Lippman, Matthew
California Western Law Review 
Volume 25 Number 1 Article 4 
1988 
OPINION OF A SCHOLAR - A Commentary on Inbau and Manak's 
"Miranda v. Arizona -- Is It Worth the Cost? (A Sample Survey, with 
Commentary, of the Expenditure of Court Time and Effort)" 
Matthew Lippman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr 
Recommended Citation 
Lippman, Matthew (1988) "OPINION OF A SCHOLAR - A Commentary on Inbau and Manak's "Miranda v. 
Arizona -- Is It Worth the Cost? (A Sample Survey, with Commentary, of the Expenditure of Court Time and 
Effort)"," California Western Law Review: Vol. 25 : No. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol25/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
OPINION OF A SCHOLAR
A Commentary on Inbau and Manak's "Miranda
v. Arizona-Is It Worth the Cost? (A Sample
Survey, with Commentary, of the Expenditure of
Court Time and Effort)"
MATTHEW LIPPMAN*
INTRODUCTION
It is an honor to be invited to respond to a paper written by an
esteemed scholar such as Professor Fred Inbau and by an individ-
ual such as James Manak, both of whom have demonstrated a
consistent concern with the problem of crime.' I have comments
on a number of points within their article, but my remarks shall
be limited to rebutting their two central contentions: first, that
Miranda consumes an inordinate amount of judicial resources;
and second, that Miranda frustrates the extraction of confessions
and interferes with crime prevention and detection.
I. THE EXPENDITURE OF RESOURCES
The authors survey the "amount of time and effort that was
being expended by various appellate courts in disposing of Mi-
randa issue cases."2 Their objective is to demonstrate that a "con-
siderable" amount of judicial time and effort has been expended
"not only on Miranda itself, but also upon its progeny ever since
that decision in 1966." 3 The basic intent of their survey was to
determine whether Miranda "is worth the cost in court time and
effort." 4
* Ph.D., Northwestern University; J.D., American; L.L.M., Harvard. Associate Pro-
fessor, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago.
1. See Inbau & Manak, Miranda v. Arizona-Is it Worth the Cost? (A Sample
Survey, with Commentary, of the Expenditure of Court Time and Effort), 24 CAL W.L.
REV. 185 (1988).
2. Id. at 186. The authors did not specify the criteria for a Miranda issue case. They
also did not provide comparative data in terms of the time expended on the litigation of
other criminal procedure issues. Id. at 187.
3. Id. at 187.
4. Id. at 186.
1
Lippman: OPINION OF A SCHOLAR - A Commentary on Inbau and Manak's "Miranda
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2015
88 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
The authors conclude that the number of Miranda issue cases
decided by the Supreme Court has increased along with a sub-
stantial proliferation in the number of words and pages contained
in the decisions.5 However, the number of Supreme Court cases
addressing Miranda issues hardly constitutes a huge expenditure
of effort.6 From 1966 through 1986, the Supreme Court decided
forty-four such cases, an average of slightly more than two per
year.7
Inbau and Manak also contend that there has been a "substan-
tial increase" in the number of words and pages in the Miranda
decisions.8 The number of words and pages in a Miranda decision
results from a number of variables, most of which are unrelated to
the complexity of the Miranda issues in a case (e.g., which justice
or judge wrote the opinion). Scrutiny of the authors' data does not
suggest that the Miranda rule is burdensome. From 1966 through
1986, substantive Miranda issues were considered in forty-four
cases, comprising a total of 606 pages and 160,000 words in the
official United States Reports.9 This is an average of roughly thir-
teen pages per case, a rather modest total for a Supreme Court
decision. In the same period, the United States circuit courts de-
cided 980 Miranda issue cases consisting of 2,155 pages, or an
average of slightly over two pages per case.10
It is true that the number of pages in the Supreme Court Mi-
randa decisions increased in the 1984-1986 period. However, there
was a decline in the average number of pages contained in the
three cases that were decided between 1986 and June 1987."1 The
earlier increase thus must be viewed over time before any reliable
figure can be derived. In addition, a comparative analysis of deci-
sions in other areas might reveal that an ideological conflict on the
Court has increased the length of other civil liberties and criminal
procedure rulings.
Thus, judging by the authors' indicators, it is not certain
whether an inordinate amount of time and effort is being con-
sumed on Miranda issues.12 The judicial time and effort devoted
to protecting the integrity of the fifth amendment is a social bene-
5. Id. at 189.
6. The number of Supreme Court cases dropped to zero in 1970; increased to three
in 1971; declined to zero in both 1972 and in 1973; and continued to fluctuate over time.
Id. at 200 (Appendix #1).
7. Id. at 188.
8. Id. at 189.
9. Id. at 188-89.
10. Id. at 189.
11. Id. at 189, 200.
12. The authors did not present data on state and federal trial courts which they
contend would have produced "staggering figures." Id. at 190.
[Vol. 25
2
California Western Law Review, Vol. 25 [2015], No. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol25/iss1/4
MIRANDA
fit, rather than a cost. Reinforcing the Miranda rule also serves to
impress the police with their general obligation to respect a sus-
pect's constitutional rights.
At any rate, the authors do not demonstrate that Miranda re-
quires the employment of additional judges, diverts time from
other more pressing concerns, or that if the Miranda rule is re-
placed by a voluntariness test, that a significant amount of time
and resources would be saved. The application of the voluntariness
test between 1884 and 196413 resulted in a bewildering array of
inconsistent decisions.14 During this period, the Court shifted its
rationale for the voluntariness test from the insurance of reliable
confessions,'15 to due process,16 to fairness,' 7 and finally to the reg-
ulation of police practices.18 This unsuccessful attempt to define
standards for determining the voluntariness of confessions con-
sumed an inordinate amount of effort, and there is little likelihood
that a reversion to the voluntariness test would prove to be any
less problematic.19
The authors suggest that the purportedly burdensome Miranda
case-load has resulted from the inability of the judiciary to resolve
the myriad of technical issues presented by the Miranda deci-
sion.2" The unsettled and expansive nature of the Miranda rule,
however, has resulted from the sustained effort by those opposed
to Miranda to undermine the integrity of the decision and its
progeny.21 A prime example is the judicial creation of a "public
safety" exception which permits the police to refrain from provid-
ing Miranda warnings to an individual under custodial interroga-
tion in situations in which there is a perceived threat to public
safety.22 There is no support for this exception in the Miranda
decision, and if expansively interpreted, it could justify police fail-
ure to provide the Miranda warnings in cases in which the police
13. The authors appeared to favor the voluntariness test. Id. at 199.
14. Ogletree, Are Confessions Really Good for the Soul? A Proposal to Minimize
Miranda, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1826, 1833 (1987). (Thirty-five cases were decided in a "rel-
atively short period" following Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).)
15. Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884), see also Wilson v. United
States, 162 U.S. 613 (1896).
16. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
17. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
18. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
19. Ogletree, supra note 14, at 1833-34.
20. "It was once thought that after the initial impact of Miranda, the various issues
that might arise from it would soon be resolved by the Supreme Court in other cases. ...
[T]he facts are to the contrary." Inbau & Manak, supra note 1, at 189.
21. See generally Office of Legal Policy, United States Department of Justice, RE-
PORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION (1987)
(The Markman Report).
22. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
1988]
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are attempting to locate kidnap victims, poisoned foodstuffs,
caches of drugs or arms, or where a potentially dangerous co-con-
spirator is at-large.
The Court's focus on Miranda issues is also a response to the
persistent attempts by the police to evade the letter of Miranda.
These efforts, in turn, are often viewed sympathetically by those
members of the Court who refuse to accept the settled nature of
the Miranda rule. In Rhode Island v. Innis,2" Innis was arrested
for robbery and murder, read his Miranda rights, and placed in a
squad car with three police officers. Two of the officers expressed
their fear that there were handicapped children "running around
in this area, and God forbid one of them might find a weapon with
shells and they might hurt themselves. 24 The suspect then led the
police to the location of the shotgun in a nearby field. 5 The Su-
preme Court ruled that this was not the "functional equivalent" of
interrogation26 and that this was "nothing more than a dialogue
between two officers to which no response from the respondent
was invited. 27
The test for interrogation established under Innis invites the po-
lice to make "innocent" comments and to engage in "private"
conversations, and in "inoffensive" conduct in the hopes that the
accused will "spontaneously" waive his Miranda rights. Justice
Stevens in his dissent in Innis28 argued that the Court's decision:
[C]reates an incentive for police to ignore a suspect's invocation
of his rights in order to make continued attempts to extract in-
formation from him. If a suspect does not appear to be suscepti-
ble to a particular type of psychological pressure, the police are
apparently free to exert that pressure on him despite his request
for counsel, so long as they are careful not to punctuate their
statements with question marks. And, if contrary to all reasona-
ble expectations, the suspect makes an incriminating statement,
that statement can be used against him at trial.29
Thus, in summary, the "costs" of Miranda are exaggerated. In-
bau and Manak fail to demonstrate that the decision creates an
inordinate expenditure of judicial time or resources, or that the
voluntariness test would place a lighter burden on the courts. The
continued litigation of Miranda issues, to a significant extent, is a
23. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
24. Id. at 294-95.
25. Id. at 295.
26. Id. at 302. The determination of the functional equivalent of interrogation under
Innis is based on the foreseeability by the police that their words or conduct are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response. Id. at 301.
27. Id. at 302.
28. Id. at 307 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 313-14 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 25
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result of a concerted effort to undermine the integrity of Miranda
and its progeny.30
II. THE IMPACT OF Miranda
Although it appears reasonable for Inbau and Manak to con-
clude that the Miranda warnings discourage the extraction of con-
fessions,31 there are various Supreme Court cases in which defend-
ants received Miranda warnings and then confessed.32 It is clear
that Miranda did not succeed in "equalizing the balance" 33 be-
tween the accused and the police.34 Studies indicate that "the Mi-
randa warnings are almost wholly ineffective, and this obtains
even when the suspect is intelligent, and the interrogation is polite,
non-custodial, and at the suspect's home." 5
Miranda is based on a rational-legalistic model in which the
police fully and effectively read suspects their Miranda rights and
the suspects knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily determine
whether to waive their Miranda rights.36 The psychological
processes that produce confessions, however, are unconscious and
irrational. A suspect's invocation of silence, for instance, often is
complicated by the fact that, psychologically, silence is viewed as
an admission of guilt and as preventing the individual from cor-
recting the police perception that he is guilty.37 Reviewing the dy-
namics of the confession process, psychologist Edwin Driver con-
cluded that the ability of suspects to assert their Miranda rights
will likely be overcome by the negative implications of silence; the
humiliation and loss of self-esteem resulting from arrest; the de-
sire to assert a sense of autonomy and control; and police manipu-
lation of the environment of interrogation.38 Driver concluded that
"subtle forces loosed in thoroughly 'legal' interrogations after
warnings are duly given appear at least equal to physical duress in
influencing behavior." 39 These pressures are so much a part of the
30. I in no way suggest that this is a conspiracy. This effort results from the complex
and subtle relationship between the police, prosecutors, the judiciary and public officials.
31. Id. Inbau & Manak, supra note 1, at 194.
32. See generally Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Oregon v. Bradshaw,
462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
33. Project, Interrogations in New Havern The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J.
1519, 1616 (1967).
34. Id.
35. Griffiths, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft Resisters,
77 YALE L.J. 300, 318 (1967).
36. Lowen, Confessions by the Accused-Does Miranda Relate to Reality?, 62 Ky.
L.J. 794, 817 (1984).
37. Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REV.
42, 57 (1968).
38. Id. at 60.
39. Id. at 61.
1988]
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institution of interrogation "that ameliorating safeguards seem fu-
tile; [and] effective measures to right the imbalance created by
the 'inherently coercive' atmosphere might be no less than tanta-
mount to the abolition of the institution."'40
The Miranda exclusionary rule has had a negligible impact on
the ability of the police to obtain confessions. One study of over
7,000 cases in which various motions to suppress were filed41
found that motions to suppress confessions were granted in only
about five percent of the cases in which such motions were filed
(0.16% of all cases in which a motion to suppress some form of
evidence was filed). 2 Only five convictions were lost because of
the suppression of a confession (0.017% of all cases in the
study).43 Thomas Y. Davies, in his seminal empirical research on
the exclusionary rule, concluded that "the general level of the
rule's effects on the criminal prosecution is marginal at most.'' 4
The Miranda rule's limited impact, in part, reflects the fact
that the Court has eviscerated the decision to the point of evapo-
ration. In case after case, the Court has "applied a balancing test
rather than a strict, bright-line rule and the rights of suspects con-
sistently have come up short when weighed against the interests of
law enforcement. The Court's balancing approach has resurrected
the voluntariness test and reopened the door to case-by-case
adjudication. 45
Custodial interrogation appears to have been limited to coer-
cive incommunicado police interrogation and the Court has cre-
ated a public safety exception to the Miranda warnings. The
Miranda warnings do not have to be read in any particular or-
der or form and the Supreme Court has refused to extend Mi-
randa to require that the police inform suspects of the inadmis-
sibility of a prior statement or that an attorney is present or
available to assist them. The definition of interrogation has been
limited to express questioning or its functional
equivalent-words or actions on the part of the police that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminat-
ing response from a suspect. Waiver is determined by the
scrupulous honor and initiation standards, both of which appear
to permit the police flexibility in seeking waivers from suspects
40. Id.
41. Nardulli, The Societal Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assess-
nient, 1983 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 585.
42. Id. at 606. Twelve of the 458 motions to suppress confessions in the study were
granted. Id. at 601.
43. Id. at 600.
44. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the
"Costs" of the Exclusionary Rule: The NIJ Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests,
1983 Am. B. FOUND. Ras. J. 611, 622.
45. Ogletree, supra note 14, at 1839.
[Vol. 25
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who have invoked their right to silence and to counsel. Finally,
the Court has permitted the use of confessions obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda for the impeachment of defendants who take
the stand in their own defense.46
The Court's limitations on Miranda must be viewed in the con-
text of its general expansion of police powers. The Court's rulings
have facilitated crime prevention and detection and have reduced
the need for the police to obtain confessions. For instance, there is
a broadening of police powers to stop, question, and search:47 the
Court has established a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule, 4 8 and has established the inevitable discovery rule;49 and the
Court has relaxed the requirements for determining probable
cause in the warrant procedure.5
Despite the ineffectiveness of Miranda in protecting suspects'
fifth amendment rights, as stated, Inbau and Manak advocate a
return to the voluntariness test.5 1 The voluntariness test was aban-
doned precisely because of its incoherence and ineffectiveness. 2
Typical is Davis v. North Carolina,53 in which the United States
Supreme Court reversed the decisions of a North Carolina trial
court and supreme court and of two federal courts that admitted a
confession of rape/murder into evidence.5 4 The confession had
been obtained from an individual described by the Court as an
"impoverished Negro with a third or fourth grade education"5
who had been held incommunicado and interrogated for sixteen
days56 while being kept on a limited diet.5 On the basis of Davis'
confession, he was convicted and sentenced to death.5 8 The Su-
preme Court majority concluded that "Davis' confessions were the
involuntary product of coercive influences and thus were constitu-
tionally inadmissible into evidence."59 On the other hand, Justice
46. Lippman, Miranda v. Arizona: Twenty Years Later, 9 CRIM. JUST. J. 241, 280-81
(1987).
47. See generally Lippman, Stop and Frisk: The Triumph of Law Enforcement Over
Private Rights, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 24 (1988).
48. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
49. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
50. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
51. Inbau & Manak, supra note 1, at 199. The authors reliance on Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) to justify the voluntariness test for confessions is mis-
placed. The Schneckloth Court limited its holding to fourth amendment rights. 412 U.S. at
242-45.
52. White, Defining Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplin, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11
(1986).
53. 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
54. Id. at 739.
55. Id. at 742.
56. Id. at 745, 749-50.
57. Id. at 746.
58. Id. at 738.
59. Id. at 752.
1988]
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Clark, with whom Justice Harlan joined in dissent,60 argued that
Davis was not subjected to "sustained or overbearing pressure" 61
and "was simply questioned for about an hour each day ....
There was no protracted grilling. Nor did the police officers oper-
ate in relays."'6 2 The voluntariness test required review by five
courts in this case.
In sum, the Miranda rule has not frustrated the extraction of
confessions; and a return to the voluntariness test is a prescription
for an ineffective, unwieldy and case-by-case approach to confes-
sions. It is undeniable that Miranda jurisprudence has become
ambiguous, complex and difficult for all but the most sophisticated
police officer to comprehend. The solution does not lie in Mi-
randa's reversal, qualification, or legislative abrogation. Miranda
is not solely an effort in "egalitarian philosophy" designed to pro-
tect the poor, uneducated or unintelligent;63 it is the threshold re-
quirement for a knowing, voluntary and intelligent exercise of a
suspect's fifth amendment rights. Miranda, however, has failed to
insulate defendants from the coercive pressures of incommunicado
interrogation, and it must be strengthened rather than weakened.
The botndaries of Miranda must be clearly drawn and those rules
which require a weighing and balancing of facts must be replaced
by "bright-line" rules.64 Consideration should also be given to the
mandatory provision of counsel for suspects undergoing custodial
interrogation.65
CONCLUSION
It should be recognized that whatever the future of Miranda,
any modification or strengthening of the rule will have a limited
impact on the problem of crime. Given the small percentage of
crimes which are reported, the minuscule number of these offenses
which lead to arrest and the insignificant number in which confes-
sions are crucial to a resolution, the practical importance of Mi-
randa is easily exaggerated.
The debate over the Miranda rule, to a large extent, is a sym-
bolic conflict over the future direction of American criminal pro-
cedure. It is vital that the Miranda rule be preserved (if not
strengthened). The further erosion or abandonment of Miranda
60. Id. at 753.
61. Id. at 755.
62. Id.
63. Inbau & Manak, supra note 1, at 185.
64. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (standard for determining cus-
todial interrogation prior to arrest).
65. See generally Ogletree, supra note 14.
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may provide the rationale and momentum for the Supreme
Court's retreat from a due process model and toward the adoption
of a crime control model of criminal procedure in which individual
rights are subordinated to state efficiency." If successful in their
efforts to undermine Miranda, the critics will next employ the
same type of contentions to argue for the erosion of the warrant
requirement, the right to counsel and the exclusionary rule. Thus,
the future direction of American criminal procedure may be at
stake in the debate over Miranda-we must not abandon our
rights in the interests of saving time, money, or resources. The
latter values have no place in constitutional litigation over civil
liberties issues. Such economic considerations will inevitably have
a concrete, practical appeal which will appear to outweigh the
seemingly abstract benefits derived from the protection of individ-
ual rights. However, to engage in this type of "economic analysis"
is an intellectually disingenuous enterprise which is a prescription
for incipient totalitarianism. In addition, the claim that Miranda
is handcuffing the police has no basis in fact.
Inbau and Manak refuse to accept settled constitutional doc-
trine and want to return to a period characterized by police abuse
of suspects during interrogation. Surveying the global violations of
human rights, it is clear that serious abuses often occur during
incommunicado police interrogation. To abrogate Miranda is to
weaken judicial oversight and to adopt the type of largely unregu-
lated interrogation practices which characterize those countries
which engage in the gross and consistent violation of individual
human rights.6 7
66. See generally H. PACKER, THE LImNis OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-246
(1968). The due process model emphasizes the protection of individual civil liberties in
order to minimize the possibility of unjust or arbitrary convictions; while the crime control
model emphasizes the broader societal interest in crime detection and prevention and re-
quires that procedural protections for the accused be limited in order to insure the efficient
prosecution and conviction of individuals guilty of having committed criminal offenses. Id.
67. See generally Lippman, The Protection of Universal Human Rights: The Prob-
lem of Torture, 1 Hum. RTs. Q. 25 (1979).
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